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            FOREWORD 
The International Research Center for Japanese Studies is very pleased to 
present here the latest addition to our academic publications, the 
Nichibunken Monograph Series. 
  The International Research Center for Japanese Studies was established 
in 1987 as an Inter-University Research Institute and has played a leading 
role in promoting interdisciplinary and comparative investigations into 
Japanese culture. The insistence on the word "International" in the name 
of our Center efers both to the importance of our extensive academic oop-
eration with scholars abroad, and to the Center's emphasis on research from 
a global perspective. 
  The Center publishes two journals, Nihon kenkyu (in Japanese) and 
Japan Review (in English), and a monograph series Nichibunken sosho for 
more extended investigations. Unfortunately, the works in the Nichibunken 
sosho are all in Japanese, and thus accessible only to foreign scholars with 
sufficient mastery of the language. 
  The Nichibunken Monograph Series was conceived with the aim of over-
coming this language barrier, and making the fruits of the research con-
ducted here more widely available to scholars abroad. The works in this 
series represent monographs written specifically for the series by perma-
nent faculty members of the Center, and have been referred and selected by 
the Editorial Board. 
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  I firmly believe that this new monograph series will prove useful to the 
many people around the world with interests in Japanese culture, and I 
sincerely hope that its publication will contribute greatly to the further 
development of Japanese studies. 
                                KAWAI I IAYAO 
                                                    Director-General 
                     International Research Center for Japanese Studies
             PREFACE 
Japanese-Soviet relations is a quite neglected subject, despite its signifi-
cance, which can hardly be overemphasized now and will probably increase 
even more in the future. Part of the reason for this academic neglect is 
ascribable to the difficulty of studying the subject. To begin with, those 
who want to specialize in this topic must be fluent in at least three lan-
guages: Russian, Japanese, and of course English, a standard academic 
means of communication in today's scholarly community. Furthermore, 
since Japanese-Soviet relations are strongly influenced by events occurring 
in the world in general and particularly in Asia, analysis of these bilateral, 
relations would not be complete unless the broader framework of interna-
tional relations is taken into consideration. In other words, those who want 
to study Japanese-Soviet relations need to be familiar with at least the 
quadrilateral power configurations inNortheast Asia, consisting of the U.S., 
the USSR, the PRC and Japan. 
  These and other difficulties notwithstanding, there have been several 
books published on Japanese-Soviet relations. These publications include: 
Donald C. Hellman's Japanese Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy: The 
Peace Agreement with the Soviet Union (1969); Savitri Vishwanathan's 
Normalization of Soviet Japanese Relations, 1945-1970: An Indian View 
(1973); John J. Stephan's The Kuril Islands: Russo-Japanese Frontiers in the 
Pacific (1974); Young C. Kim's Japanese-Soviet Relations: Interaction of 
Politics, Economics and National Security (1974); Bhabani Sen Gupta's 
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Soviet Asian Relations in the 1970s and Beyond: An Interper-ceptional Study 
(1976); Rodger Swearingen's The Soviet Union and Post- War Japan: 
Escalating Challenge and Response (1978); and Rajenara Kumar Jain's The 
USSR and Japan: 1945-1980 (1981). These books help to fill the scholarly 
gap, but they are not sufficient; the focus and interest of some of these 
books are either limited in terms of the time period and field of relations 
they cover or they are superficially comprehensive. 
  In an attempt to make my book different from those that have been pub-
lished in the past under similar titles, I have included the following salient 
features: 1) specific emphasis on the national security aspect rather than the 
"Northern Territories" issue; 2) examination of the dynamic relationships 
between politics, security, territory and economics; 3) discussion of deter-
minants, capabilities, strategies, and the limits of Soviet policy toward 
Japan; 4) analysis of the dynamic process of action-reaction in the relations 
between Japan and the Soviet Union; and 5) detailed examination of 
Japan-Soviet relations in the late Brezhnev era and the Andropov era 
(1977-1983).
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          INTRODUCTION 
Relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, now the Russian Federation, 
have remained cool throughout most of the postwar period and were par-
ticularly unstable and strained in the period covered in this book; i.e., the 
late Brezhnev era and the Andropov era (1976-1983). What is the nature of 
these unstable and strained relations? 
  To begin with, politico-diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union 
and Japan have lacked a stable legal basis. Although diplomatic relations 
between the Soviet Union and Japan were normalized in 1956, a peace 
treaty has yet to be concluded. Without a peace treaty, some schools of 
thought on international law' maintain that these two countries have not 
put a complete end to the state of war. For example, the late Professor L. 
Oppenheim of Cambridge University states in one of the most authoritative 
standard textbooks on international law: "The most frequent end of war is a 
treaty of peace. Many writers correctly call a treaty of peace the normal 
mode of terminating war."2 A Soviet extbook, International Law, edited by 
the Institute of Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences, states the same 
view: "a peace treaty legally ends a state of war between the signatory states, 
thereby establishing political and other relations between them."3 
  One way to illustrate the abnormal degree to which Japanese-Soviet 
relations became stalemated is to compare them with the bilateral rela-
tions between Japan and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Japan 
and China normalized relations in 1972 and concluded a peace treaty 
only six years later, in 1978. In contrast, Japan and the Soviet Union, 
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despite their earlier normalization of relations in 1956, have still not 
concluded a peace treaty. 
  The poor record of exchange visits by top political leaders also demon-
strates that diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union have 
been neither warm nor smooth. The underlying assumption here is that 
communication and contacts between top political leaders are indicative of 
the state of relations between countries. In the 27-year period from the nor-
malization of relations between Moscow and Tokyo (1956) to the end of 
the period covered in this book (1983), only one Japanese Premier (Tanaka 
Kakuei) visited the Soviet Union (in 1973), while the highest Soviet polit-
ical leader ever to visit Japan was USSR Deputy Prime Minister Anastas 
Mikoyan (in 1961 and 1964). During the same period of time, six Japanese 
foreign ministers visited Moscow, while the Soviet counterpart, Andrei A. 
Gromyko, came to Tokyo only three times (in 1966, 1972 and 1976). 
Compared with the diplomatic intercourse between the USSR and other 
Western capitalist countries (such as the Federal Republic of Germany, 
France, and the United States), visited by both Nikita S. Khrushchev and 
Leonid I. Brezhnev, the number of exchange visits between the Soviet 
Union and Japan was extremely small. Of particularly significance is the fact 
that both Soviet and Japanese foreign ministers refused to visit one another's 
capitals; instead they held brief meetings in New York while attending the 
United Nations General Assembly. This is a clear indication of an abnormal 
state of Japanese-Soviet bilateral relations. 
  Japanese-Soviet relations have also been unstable and strained in terms 
of security. Publicly, Tokyo has been advocating the so-called "omnidi-
mentional or all-directional foreign policy"-diplomacy aimed at devel-
oping friendly relations with all countries in the world. It is an open secret, 
however, that, in practice, Tokyo regards the USSR as almost the sole 
"potential threat"4 to the security of Japan
, particularly since the conclu-
sion in 1978 of the Sino Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty, by which 
the PRC ceased being a potential Japanese enemy. In his much-disputed 
remarks made during his January 1983 trip to Washington, Prime Minister 
Nakasone Yasuhiro made no secret of the country that demanded increased 
Japanese security efforts. The outspoken prime minister declared that "the
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whole Japanese archipelago should be like an unsinkable aircraft carrier 
against infiltration of the [Soviet] Backfire bomber." (emphasis added by 
Kimura Hiroshi).5 He also stated that "Japan should have complete control of 
the four straits that go through the Japanese islands so that there should be 
no passage of Soviet submarines nor other naval activities." (emphasis added 
by H.K.) 
  Although Moscow does not similarly regard Japan as a threat to national 
security, concern has arisen over Japan's increasingly independent diplo-
matic and defense postures. The Soviets began to worry about Tokyo's 
possible participation in such anti-Soviet security alliances as a "Washington -Tokyo-Seoul" or "Washington-Tokyo-Beijing" axis, or 
JANZUS (Japan-Australia-New Zealand-United States) alliance. Moscow 
showed particular concern over the expanding U.S. Japan military coop-
eration. In an attempt to check Tokyo's decision to accept U.S. F-16's at 
the Misawa airbase in northern Japan and to counter Nakasone's remarks 
cited above, Soviet leader Iurii V. Andropov threatened the Japanese with 
nuclear retaliation. Such escalation of action and reaction on security mat-
ters further strained relations between these two neighboring countries. 
  Japanese-Soviet relations have also been strained in nonpolitical and 
nonmilitary areas such as economic, scientific, cultural and sports. It 
may be true that exchanges between countries with different political 
and economic systems are not as frequent as those between countries 
with the same or similar systems, and it may also be true that such 
exchanges inherently have serious limitations. It is undeniable, however, 
that by the nature of today's increasing tendency toward interdepen-
dence, we have been overcoming the ideological barriers and systemic 
disparities, especially in the fields of trade and other economic, cultural 
and athletic activities. Trade relations between West Germany, France 
and the Soviet Union and those between Japan and the PRC provide 
good illustrations of this. Yet, even in nonpolitical and nonmilitary 
fields, Japan and the Soviet Union have been unsuccessful in developing 
a good, stable relationship. Unlike West Germany, France, Italy, 
Finland and other West European countries, Japan failed to conclude a 
long-term intergovernmental agreement on economic cooperation with
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the USSR;? Japan's trade with the Soviet Union in the period covered in 
this book constituted less than two percent of Japan's entire foreign 
trade. Nor has a long-term fishing agreement been signed yet between 
Japan and the Soviet Union. Personnel exchanges of high government 
officials and government-sponsored cultural and athletic delegations 
between Japan and the Soviet Union have been irregular at best, and at 
times even frozen.
